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Abstract
This paper presents a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with nominal rigidities, cap-
ital accumulation and finite horizons. Our New Keynesian framework exhibits intergenerational
wealth effects and is intended to investigate the macroeconomic implications of fiscal policy, which is
specified by either a debt-based tax rule or a balanced-budget rule allowing for temporary deficits.
When calibrated to euro area quarterly data, the model predicts that fiscal expansions generate a
trade-off in output dynamics between short-term gains and medium-term losses. It is shown that the
effects of fiscal shocks crucially depend upon the conduct of monetary policy. Simulation analysis
suggests that balanced-budget requirements enhance the determinacy properties of feedback interest
rate rules by guaranteeing inflation stabilization.
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1 Introduction
The implications of different fiscal policies and the interaction between fiscal and monetary policies in
terms of macroeconomic stability and price developments are key topics in the current policy debate
as well as in the academic research. Fiscal discipline and sound budgetary positions are considered to
be essential for macroeconomic and price stability, even in the presence of a fully independent monetary
authority. This is notably reflected in the fiscal rules enshrined in the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability
and Growth Pact of the European Union.1
Dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (dsge) models, incorporating imperfect competition and nom-
inal rigidities, are increasingly adopted as the basic tool-kit for the evaluation of monetary policy.2
However, in the infinitely-lived representative agent paradigm in which the Ricardian equivalence holds,
changes in public debt have no effect on aggregate consumption and potential redistributions of wealth
across generations are neglected. Fiscal policy matters for price stability mainly when it is ‘active’ in
Leeper (1991)’s sense, that is, the stability of real public debt is not respected for any bounded sequences
of all other endogenous variables.3 Alternatively, the introduction of distortionary taxation, along the
lines suggested by Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2007), or the introduction of rule-of-thumb consumers, as
proposed by Gal´ı, Lo´pez-Salido and Valle´s (2004, 2007), allow to examine the non-trivial implications of
‘passive’ fiscal policies, when fiscal solvency is guaranteed.
In this paper we focus on a different line of research in which the Ricardian equivalence proposition is
not satisfied, because the assumption of identical infinitely-lived private agents is relaxed. Starting from
the finite-lifetime approach first outlined by Yaari (1965) and Blanchard (1985), we enrich the analysis
by incorporating the overlapping generations (olg) setup into a dsge monetary model with nominal
rigidities, capital accumulation and investment adjustment costs.4
We calibrate a linearized version of the model using euro area quarterly data. Fiscal policy is described
by either a debt-based tax rule or a balanced-budget rule allowing for temporary deficits. Monetary policy
is described by a standard Taylor rule. The proposed model is able to capture micro-founded wealth effects
that influence aggregate consumption dynamics. Therefore, the lm relation and the dynamics of both
public debt and asset prices matter for the monetary and fiscal policy transmission mechanisms. The
1The general government deficit should not exceed the 3% to gdp reference value and the debt to gdp ratio should be
below 60% or, if above, approach to that reference value at a satisfactory pace. Furthermore, EMU Member States are
required to have medium term objectives, which range from 1% deficit to close to balance or in surplus positions, depending
on the country specific public debt ratio and potential growth.
2See Rotemberg and Woodford (1997, 1999), Clarida, Gal´ı and Gertler (1999), McCallum and Nelson (1999a, 1999b),
Taylor (1999a), Woodford (2003), Gal´ı and Gertler (2007), Gal´ı (2008), and references therein.
3See Woodford (1998, 2001, 2003).
4Annicchiarico, Marini and Piergallini (2008) examine the interactions between monetary and fiscal policy in a baseline
New Keynesian model with olg, abstracting from capital accumulation. Leith and von Thadden (2008) analyze the issue
of equilibrium determinacy in a continuous-time olg model incorporating price stickiness and capital accumulation, in the
absence of investment adjustment costs and asset price dynamics.
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theoretical framework we describe proves to be particularly suitable for the analysis of macroeconomic
implications of fiscal and monetary policy, also when the fiscal authority aims at avoiding explosive paths
for the public debt.
We use our New Keynesian model with olg and capital accumulation to analyze the role of different
fiscal policy rules for business cycle fluctuations and for the design of monetary policy. We first show
that equilibrium determinacy is affected by the specification of fiscal policy. The ‘Taylor principle’ (the
nominal interest rate responding more than one-to-one to a permanent increase in inflation5) might
not be sufficient for equilibrium determinacy under a ‘passive’ feedback tax-rule of the Leeper-style.
Conversely, both ‘passive’ and ‘active’ monetary policies are compatible with equilibrium uniqueness
under a balanced-budget rule.
A prediction of the model is that fiscal expansions tend to generate an intertemporal trade-off: positive
fiscal shocks are expansionary in the short run but are likely to generate persistent adverse effects on
economic activity in the medium run, shading some light in the debate on the so called non-keynesian
effects. Remarkably, it is shown that the effects of fiscal policy crucially depend on the type of monetary
policy rule adopted by the central bank, providing a sound micro-founded rationale for the view, first
suggested by Sims (1988), that empirical studies on the effects of fiscal policy should explicitly take
into account monetary factors.6 Finally, simulation analysis supports the view that balanced-budget
requirements, beyond enhancing the determinacy properties of feedback interest rate rules, are suitable
for preserving price stability.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we present the model, derive the first order
conditions and introduce the policy rules. The model is linearized around a non-stochastic steady state
and calibrated to euro area quarterly data in Section 3. In Section 4 we examine equilibrium properties
and dynamics under alternative fiscal and monetary policy rules. In Section 5 we develop stochastic
simulations and assess the performance of different combinations of policy rules. The main conclusions
are summarized in Section 6.
2 The Model
In this Section we develop a dsge model extended to incorporate overlapping generations and capital
accumulation. The economy consists of seven types of agents: finitely-lived consumers, perfectly com-
petitive life insurance companies, a continuum of firms producing differentiated intermediate goods and
setting nominal prices in a staggered fashion, perfectly competitive final goods firms, perfectly competitive
5See, e.g., Bullard and Mitra (2002), McCallum (2003), and Woodford (2001, 2003) for a discussion.
6See, for instance, Perotti (2002) and Mountford and Uhlig (2008) for empirical approaches along these lines.
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capital producers, the monetary authority and the fiscal authority.
2.1 Consumers
The demand-side is described by a stochastic discrete-time version of the Yaari (1965)-Blanchard (1985)
olg model with no intergenerational bequest motive, extended to include endogenous labor supply and
money holding choices.7
The economy is populated by forward looking agents with identical preferences and facing the same
constant probability of death, λ ∈ (0, 1), in each time period. Birth and death rates are the same. For
analytical convenience, total population is normalized to one. Hence, in each time period a new cohort
of size λ is born and a fraction of equal size of the population dies. At time t the size of the generation
born at time s ≤ t is λ (1− λ)
t−s
. Since the probability of death is constant overtime, the expected life
horizon of an agent born at time s is given by
∑
∞
t−s=1(t − s)λ (1− λ)
t−s−1
= 1/λ. It should be noted
that for λ→ 0 the expected lifetime 1/λ→∞, i.e. agents face an infinite life horizon.
Since there is no intergenerational altruism and lifetime is uncertain, a perfectly competitive life
insurance market is assumed to be operative as in Yaari (1965) and Blanchard (1985). In particular,
in order to avoid unintended bequest, insurance companies collect financial wealth from the deceased
members of the population and pay fair premia to survivors. The zero-profit condition in the insurance
sector requires that the gross return on the insurance contract, that is incorporated into the individual
flow budget constraint, is given by 1/ (1− λ).
2.1.1 The Individual Optimization Problem
Individuals face stochastic sequences of prices, interest rates, taxes and profit shares, and decide on
consumption, real money holdings, labor supply and wealth accumulation. Real money balances yield
direct utility in the spirit of Sidrauski (1967) and Brock (1975).8 Total non-human wealth consists of
money, government bonds and capital.
The objective of the representative agent j belonging to the generation born at time s ≤ 0 is to
maximize the following expected lifetime utility function:
E0
∞∑
t=0
[β (1− λ)]tU
(
Cs,t (j) ,
Ms,t (j)
Pt
, Ns,t (j)
)
, (1)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the subjective discount factor, Pt is the price index, Cs,t (j) is consumption of the final
good, Ms,t (j) denote end-of-period money holdings, and Ns,t (j) represents the agent’s j labor, assumed
7A continuous-time monetary version of the Blanchard-Yaari framework has been previously developed by Marini and
van der Ploeg (1988).
8The implications of real money balances in a dsge model with olg are examined in Piergallini (2006).
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to be supplied under monopolistic competition. Specifically, each individual j faces the following demand
function for her labor services:9
Ns,t (j) =
(
Ws,t (j)
Wt
)
−ηt
Nt, (2)
where ηt > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between differentiated labor inputs, Nt is total employment,
Ws,t (j) is the individual nominal wage rate, and Wt indicates the aggregate wage index:
Wt =
(
t∑
s=−∞
∫ λ(1−λ)t−s
0
Ws,t (j)
1−ηt dj
) 1
1−ηt
. (3)
The elasticity of labor demand, ηt, is the same across workers, but is allowed to be time variant.
The flow budget constraint of the representative agent j born at time s is
Bs,t+1 (j)
Rt
+Ms,t (j) +QtKs,t+1 (j)
≤
1
1− λ
(As,t (j) +Ws,t (j)Ns,t (j) + Zs,t (j)− Ts,t (j)− PtCs,t (j)) , (4)
where Bs,t (j) denote nominal riskless government bonds carried over from period t − 1 and paying one
unit of nume´raire in period t, Rt denotes the gross nominal interest rate on bonds purchased in period
t, Qt is the price of capital, Zs,t (j) is the share in the profits of intermediate goods firms, Ts,t (j) denote
nominal lump-sum net taxes, and As,t (j) is the total beginning-of-period financial wealth given by
As,t (j) ≡ Bs,t (j) +Ms,t−1 (j) +
[
(1− δ)Qt +R
k
t
]
Ks,t (j) , (5)
where δ is the depreciation rate and Rkt indicates the nominal rental rate of capital holdings, Ks,t (j).
10
The representative consumer j of the generation born at time s ≤ 0 chooses the set {Cs,0 (j) ,
Ms,0 (j) ,Ws,0 (j) Bs,1 (j) ,Ks,1 (j)} and the sequences of contingency plans {Cs,t (j) , Ms,t (j) ,Ws,t (j) ,
Bs,t+1 (j) ,Ks,t+1 (j)}
∞
t=1 in order to maximize (1) subject to (2) and (4), given the initial wealth As,0 (j)
and the stochastic sequences {Zs,t (j) , Ts,t (j) , Rt, R
k
t , Pt, Qt,Wt, Nt}
∞
t=0, whose exogenously given prob-
ability distributions are known by the consumers. Profit shares and lump-sum net taxes are age-
independent, while newly born agents do not hold any financial assets, for the sake of simplicity.
In order to obtain analytically tractable solutions for aggregate variables, we specialize on the following
9This demand function derives from the firms’ optimizing behavior. See section 2.2.
10It should be noticed that the flow budget constraint incorporates the fair premium payment deriving from the insurance
contract. The timing convention is consistent with the discrete time versions of the Yaari-Blanchard olg model adopted
by Frenkel and Razin (1986) and Smets and Wouters (2002).
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period utility function:
U
(
Cs,t (j) ,
Ms,t (j)
Pt
, Ns,t (j)
)
≡ log
[
Cs,t (j)
1−γ
(
Ms,t (j)
Pt
)γ
− V (Ns,t (j))
]
, (6)
where V ′ (•) , V ′′ (•) > 0. Theoretical foundations that justify the adoption of this utility function in the
perpetual-youth models with endogenous labor supply are developed by Ascari and Rankin (2007).11
The solution to the consumer dynamic optimization problem yields the following first order necessary
conditions:
1 = βRtEt
{
C˜s,t (j)
C˜s,t+1 (j)
Pt
Pt+1
}
, (7)
1 = βEt
{
C˜s,t (j)
C˜s,t+1 (j)
Pt
Pt+1
(1− δ)Qt+1 +R
k
t+1
Qt
}
, (8)
Ms,t (j)
Pt
=
γ
(1− γ) (1− λ)
Rt
Rt − 1
Cs,t (j) , (9)
Ws,t (j)
Pt
=
1 + uwt
1− γ
(
PtCs,t (j)
Ms,t (j)
)γ
V ′(Ns,t (j)), (10)
where C˜s,t (j) ≡ Cs,t (j) − (PtCs,t (j) /Ms,t (j))
γ
V (Ns,t (j)) can be interpreted as consumption net of
its ‘subsistence’ level (see Ascari and Rankin, 2007); expressions (7) and (8) are the stochastic Euler
equations, while (9) and (10) represent the efficiency static conditions on money demand and labor supply
choices, respectively. The optimality condition for labor supply incorporates the exogenous optimal wage
markup uwt = 1/ (ηt − 1), reflecting the agent’s market power. Because wages are perfectly flexible, in the
symmetric equilibrium all workers of all generations will set the same wage and supply the same hours
of labor, i.e. Ws,t (j) =Wt and Ns,t (j) = Nt for all j ∈ [0, 1].
Let define the stochastic discount factor of the representative agent j of generation s as
Λt,t+1(s, j) ≡ β
C˜s,t (j)
C˜s,t+1 (j)
Pt
Pt+1
. (11)
Combining (11) with (7) one obtains
Et {Λt,t+1 (s, j)} =
1
Rt
, (12)
for each s ∈ (−∞, t] and j ∈ [0, 1]. At the optimum the flow budget constraint (4) holds with equality in
11In particular, Ascari and Rankin (2007) demonstrate that this specification of preferences allows one to rule out a
negative labor supply problem which may arise for older generations in models a` la Yaari-Blanchard with leisure in the
utility function when leisure is a normal good.
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each time period and the transversality condition precluding Ponzi’s games must be verified:
lim
T→∞
Et
{
(1− λ)
T−t
Λt,T (s, j)As,T (j)
}
= 0, (13)
where Λt,T (s, j) ≡
∏T
k=T+1 Λk−1,k (s, j) and Λt,t (s, j) ≡ 1. Iterating the budget constraint (4) forward,
using (12), and imposing the transversality condition (13), one can derive the individual consumption
function as:12
PtC˜s,t (j)= χ
 As,t (j) +Hs,t (j)
− 11−γEt
∑
∞
T=t (1− λ)
T−t
Λt,T (s, j)Ψs,T (j)
−γ
PTV (Ns,T (j))
 , (14)
where χ ≡ (1− γ) [1− β (1− λ)] is invariant both across time and across generations, the term Ψs,t (j)
≡ Ms,t (j) / PtCs,t (j) = {γ/ [(1− γ) (1− λ)]} [Rt/ (Rt − 1)] is identical for all generations, and Hs,t (j)
is human wealth, defined as the expected present discounted value of future labor incomes and of profit
shares net of taxes:
Hs,t (j) ≡ Et
∞∑
T=t
(1− λ)
T−t
Λt,T (s, j) (Ws,T (j)Ns,T (j) + Zs,T (j)− Ts,T (j)) . (15)
2.1.2 Aggregation
The aggregate value Xt of a general economic variable Xs,t (j) is obtained as a sum across cohorts:
Xt ≡
t∑
s=−∞
(∫ λ(1−λ)t−s
0
Xs,t (j) dj
)
. (16)
Aggregation of all generations alive at time t yields the following expressions for aggregate non-human
wealth, aggregate consumption, aggregate real money demand and aggregate labor supply, respectively:
Bt+1
Rt
+Mt +QtKt+1 = At +WtNt + Zt − Tt − PtCt, (17)
PtC˜t = χ
[
At +Ht −
1
1− γ
Et
∞∑
T=t
(1− λ)
T−t
Λt,TΨ
−γ
T PTV (NT )
]
, (18)
Mt
Pt
=
γ
1− γ
Rt
Rt − 1
Ct, (19)
Wt
Pt
=
1 + uwt
1− γ
Ψ−γt V
′(Nt). (20)
Combining equations (17) and (18) and using the definition of aggregate human wealth, Ht (j) ≡
12See Appendix A for derivation.
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Et
∑
∞
T=t (1− λ)
T−t
Λt,T (WTNT + ZT − TT ), one obtains the following dynamic equation for aggregate
consumption:13
PtC˜t =
1
β
Et
{
Λt,t+1Pt+1C˜t+1
}
+
λχ
β (1− λ)
Et {Λt,t+1At+1} , (21)
Equation (21) reveals that in the general case of finite lifetime (λ > 0), the time path of consumption is
affected by the aggregate level of non-human wealth.
2.2 Firms
2.2.1 Final Goods Firm
The final good representative firm faces a ces production function given by Yt =
(∫ 1
0
Xt (i)
ε−1
ε di
) ε
ε−1
,
where Yt denotes aggregate output and Xt (i) is the quantity of intermediate good produced by interme-
diate goods firm i. Intratemporal profit maximization, taking as given the final good price Pt and the
prices of the intermediate goods Pt (i), for all i ∈ [0, 1], yields the demand for each variety i as a function
of the relative price of i and of total production, Xt (i) = (Pt (i) /Pt)
−ε
Yt. In addition, the zero profit
condition implies that the price index is Pt =
(∫ 1
0
Pt (i)
1−ε
di
) 1
1−ε
.
2.2.2 Intermediate Goods Firm
Each intermediate goods producer faces the following production function:
Yt (i) = ̥tKt (i)
α
Nt (i)
1−α
, (22)
where ̥t is an exogenous technology parameter, and Kt (i) and Nt (i) represent the capital and labor
services used by firm i, respectively. The labor input used by each producer is defined as a ces composite
of individual consumer labor input:
Nt (i) =
(
t∑
s=−∞
∫ λ(1−λ)t−s
0
Ns,t (i, j)
ηt−1
ηt dj
) ηt
ηt−1
. (23)
Aggregation across intermediate goods optimizing firms yields the labor market demand curve (2).
Following Calvo (1983), nominal price rigidity is modeled by allowing random intervals between price
changes. Each period a firm adjusts its price with a constant probability (1− θ) and keeps its price fixed
with probability θ. The cost minimization condition requires that
Kt (i)
Nt (i)
=
α
1− α
Wt
Rkt
. (24)
13See Appendix B for derivation.
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Real marginal cost, MCt, is given by
MCt =
α−α (1− α)
α−1
̥t
(
Rkt
Pt
)α(
Wt
Pt
)1−α
, (25)
thereby being identical across firms.
The optimal pricing decision of the firm i revising its price in period t is to choose the price Pt (i) to
maximize
Et
∞∑
T=t
θT−tΛt,TYT (i) (Pt (i)− PTMCT ) , (26)
subject to the sequence of demand constraints
{
YT (i) = XT (i) = (Pt (i) /PT )
−ε
YT
}
∞
T=t
. The first order
condition for the optimal price is
Et
∞∑
T=t
θT−tΛt,TYTP
ε
T [Pt (i)− (1 + µ
p)PTMCT ] = 0, (27)
where µp = 1/ (ε− 1) is the equilibrium net markup. From condition (27) it emerges that firms set their
price equal to a markup over a weighted average of expected future nominal marginal costs. Finally, the
price index follows a law of motion of the form:
Pt =
[
θ (Pt−1)
1−ε
+ (1− θ)Pt (i)
1−ε
]1/1−ε
. (28)
2.2.3 Capital Producers
The representative capital producer employs investment (expressed in the same composite as the final
good) and the existing capital stock to produce new capital goods, according to a standard crs production
function, φ (It/Kt)Kt, where φ
′ (•) > 0, φ′′ (•) ≤ 0, φ′ (δ) = 1, φ (δ) = δ, capturing convex adjustment
costs. Hence, the capital accumulation equation is given by
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + φ
(
It
Kt
)
Kt. (29)
Profit maximization implies the following optimality condition:
Qtφ
′
(
It
Kt
)
= Pt. (30)
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2.3 The Monetary Authority
The monetary authority controls the nominal interest rate, rt ≡ Rt − 1. Monetary policy is described in
terms of a feedback rule where the instrument rate is set as an increasing function of the inflation rate.
Specifically, the policy reaction function takes the following form:14
r˜t = ρr r˜t−1 + (1− ρr)
(
φpipit + φY Ŷt
)
+ εrt , (31)
where r˜t ≡ rt − r denotes the deviation of the nominal interest rate from its steady state level, pit ≡
Pt/Pt−1 − 1 is the rate of inflation between t and t− 1, Ŷt ≡ log Yt − log Y is the log-deviation of output
from its steady state level, φpi, φY ≥ 0 are parameters capturing the responsiveness of monetary policy
to inflation and output, ρr ∈ (0, 1) is the parameter featuring a smoothing behavior of the central bank,
and εRt ∼ N
(
0, σ2εrt
)
is an i.i.d. monetary disturbance.
2.4 The Fiscal Authority
The flow budget constraint of the government in nominal terms is given by
Bt+1
Rt
+Mt = Bt +Mt−1 + PtGt − Tt, (32)
where Gt denotes real government spending for final goods. The fiscal authority has three policy instru-
ments: bonds, government spending, and net lump sum taxes, of which only two can be chosen freely
and the remaining follows residually from the government’s sequential budget constraint.
The budget constraint (32) can be written in real terms as
lt+1
Rt
=
lt
1 + pit
+Gt − τ t −
Rt − 1
Rt
mt, (33)
where lt ≡ (Bt +Mt−1) /Pt−1 denote total real government liabilities outstanding at the beginning of
period t in units of t−1 final goods, τ t ≡ Tt/Pt real tax collections, andmt ≡Mt/Pt real money balances.
Our analysis focuses on two alternative fiscal policy rules: (i) a debt-based tax rule of the Leeper
(1991)-style; (ii) a balanced-budget rule allowing for bounded deficits or surpluses, of the kind presented
by Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2000). Both rules are extended to incorporate a cyclical component in the
spirit of Taylor (2000a, 2000b).15
14See, e.g., Clarida, Gal´ı and Gertler (1998, 2000), Judd and Rudebusch (1998), Taylor (1999b), Gerlach and Schnabel
(2000), Orphanides (2001, 2003), and Sauer and Sturm (2007) for empirical evidence on Taylor-type rules.
15Ascari and Rankin (2007) analyze the issue of fiscal policy effectiveness in a New Keynesian model with olg assuming
a real government debt targeting regime.
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2.4.1 Debt-based Tax Rule
Under a debt-based regime, fiscal policy is assumed to be conducted according to the following feedback
tax rule:
τ̂ t = τ l l̂t + τY Ŷt, (34)
where τ̂ t ≡ (τ t − τ) /Y and l̂t ≡ (lt − l) /Y denote, respectively, the fluctuations of real taxes and
government liabilities, both measured in units of steady-state output, and τ l, τY ≥ 0 are fiscal policy
parameters. Such a specification takes into account both a debt stabilization motive (of the kind described
by Leeper, 1991), capturing the structural component of fiscal policy, and an output stabilization motive,
reflecting the cyclical component.16
2.4.2 Balanced-budget Rule
As an alternative fiscal regime we consider a balanced-budget rule allowing for bounded deficits or sur-
pluses. As emphasized by Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2000), this fiscal rule is arguably more realistic than
a period-by period balanced budget requirement. In addition, it is in the spirit of the Maastricht Treaty
and the Stability and Growth Pact, which require country specific medium term objectives which range
from a 1% deficit to a close to balance or in surplus position, guaranteeing a sufficient margin below the
reference value of 3% of GDP for the general government deficit.
The nominal fiscal deficit, Dt, is defined as government expenditures and interest payments on the
outstanding public debt net of tax revenues:
Dt ≡ PtGt + (Rt−1 − 1)
Bt
Rt−1
− Tt. (35)
Using (35) into the government’s flow budget constraint (32) yields
Bt+1
Rt
+Mt =
Bt
Rt−1
+Mt−1 +Dt. (36)
We assume that fiscal policy is described in terms of a feedback rule in the real deficit, incorporating
both an output stabilization motive and a smoothing component.17 In particular, the fiscal rule takes
the following form:
dt = ρddt−1 + (1− ρd) δY Ŷt + ε
d
t , (37)
where dt ≡ (Dt/Pt) /Y indicates the real deficit, measured in units of steady-state output, δY ≤ 0 is a
16The so-called ‘Taylor fiscal rules’, featuring both ‘active’ and ‘passive’ components, are the object of recent empirical
contributions. See, for instance, Gal´ı and Perotti (2003), and Favero and Monacelli (2003, 2005).
17Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2000) instead assume exogenous ‘secondary’ deficits, without inertia.
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fiscal policy parameter, ρd ∈ (0, 1) is a parameter measuring the persistence of budget deficit dynamics
shown in the data, and εdt ∼ N
(
0, σ2εd
)
is an i.i.d. fiscal policy shock.
2.5 Market Clearing
Factor and good markets must be in equilibrium, so that the following equalities hold at all times:
Nt =
∫ 1
0
Nt (i) di, Kt =
∫ 1
0
Kt (i) di, Yt (i) = Xt (i), for all i ∈ [0, 1], and
Yt = Ct + It +Gt. (38)
3 Calibration
The implications of the foregoing framework are examined by computing a log-linearized version of the
equilibrium conditions around a non-stochastic steady state with zero inflation.18 The log-linearized
model is solved in its state-space representation by applying the Klein (2000) algorithm.19 We parame-
terize the model on euro area quarterly data for the period 1970Q1-2003Q4.20 The baseline calibration
is reported in Table 1.
The shares of steady-state consumption and private investment in total output are set consistently
with their observed sample averages, 0.2. We set the annual steady state public debt to GDP ratio
at 60%, according to the Maastricht criterion. The observed annual money velocity is 3.7, using the
monetary aggregate M1. We set the steady state real interest rate equal to 4% per annum, as in Smets
and Wouters (2003). We assign a value of 0.015 to the probability of death between two consecutive
periods, as in Leith and Wren-Lewis (2000).
The function characterizing the agents’ dis-utility of labor is assumed to be
V (Nt) ≡
N1+ϕt
1 + ϕ
, (39)
where ϕ > 0 represents the inverse of the (Frisch) elasticity of labor supply with respect to the real wage.
We set ϕ equal to 0.47, as in Benigno and Benigno (2006). Furthermore, we calibrate the steady state
fraction of time in employment to be 1/3, according to the standard eight-hours working day.
The probability of maintaining prices fixed between two consecutive quarters for firms subject to
nominal rigidities is set equal to 0.75, that is consistent with the estimates obtained by Gal´ı, Gertler
and Lo´pez-Salido (2001) for the euro area. Following Smets and Wouters (2003), we set the annual
18See Appendix C for details.
19See Appendix D.
20The data are obtained from the database constructed by Fagan, Henry and Mestre (2005).
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depreciation rate, δ, equal to 10% per annum and the elasticity of output with respect to capital, α,
equal to 0.3. Following King and Watson (1996), the elasticity of investment with respect to asset prices,
η, is set equal to unity. Values of all remaining parameters are set according to the steady state relations
and are reported in Table 1.
We assume that government expenditure follows a univariate autoregressive process given by
Ĝt = ρGĜt−1 + ε
G
t , (40)
where Ĝt ≡
Gt−G
Y . The estimated first-order autocorrelation and the standard deviation of the innovation
are ρG = 0.966 and σεG = 0.001, respectively. The technology shock is also assumed to follow a univariate
autoregressive process, ̥̂ t = ρ̥ ̥̂ t−1 + ε̥t , (41)
where ̥̂ t ≡ log̥t − log̥. We fit the stochastic process (41) empirically using the standard Solow
residual and obtain ρ̥ = 0.958 and σε̥ = 0.005. Following Smets and Wouters (2003), the wage markup
is assumed to be a white noise. We set the standard deviations of the wage markup and the monetary
policy shocks equal to Smets and Wouters’ estimates, σuw = 0.003 and σεr = 0.001. Finally, the baseline
calibration of equations (31) and (37) sets ρr, ρd = 0.9, consistently with a realistic high degree of inertia
displayed by monetary and fiscal rules.
4 Fiscal Policy and Equilibrium Dynamics
The main feature of the present model is that it exhibits wealth effects on aggregate demand that make
the lm relation and the dynamics for both government liabilities and asset prices not recursive to the
equilibrium system.21 This generates a non-trivial interaction between monetary and fiscal policy. On
the one hand, fiscal policy affects the evolution of aggregate demand since public debt is net wealth
for the living generations, thereby influencing inflation dynamics. On the other hand, monetary policy
affects debt service through its decisions on the nominal interest rate, hence modifying the dynamics of
government liabilities.
For each fiscal rule, we first investigate the issue of rational expectations equilibrium determinacy to
identify the range of policy parameters ruling out sunspots and instabilities;22 then we examine impulse
21By contrast, in the standard New Keynesian representative agent setup, real financial wealth does not affect consumption
dynamics and monetary policy influences consumption only through the effects produced on the current and future short-
term real interest rates.
22A rational expectations equilibrium is (locally) determined if and only if there are unique bounded sequences for all
endogenous variables of the model in periods t ≥ 0, given the bounded exogenous disturbances processes. See Woodford
(2003). As we shall see, nesting multiple numerical loops, conditions for determinacy of the present model are checked for
different combinations of the policy parameters in the relevant interval with an increment of 0.01. Each time that the model
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response functions to fiscal shocks.
4.1 Debt-based Tax Rule
Following Woodford (1998, 2001, 2003), fiscal policy is ‘passive’ (or ‘locally Ricardian’) if and only if the
dynamics of real government liabilities implied by the tax rule are bounded for any bounded sequences
for the other endogenous variables and for the exogenous disturbances. According to this definition, the
tax rule (34) is passive (active) if and only if |(1 + r) (1− τ l)| < (>) 1.
23 As in Woodford (2003), we
focus on rules in which τ l ≤ 1. Thus, our calibration implies that for a passive (active) fiscal policy τ l
must be larger (smaller) than 0.01.
Figure 1 shows the regions of determinacy of equilibrium under the tax rule for different combinations
of fiscal and monetary policy parameters. Panel A reveals that a passive fiscal policy regime is compatible
with equilibrium determinacy when combined with a sufficiently active monetary policy. On the other
hand, an active fiscal policy requires a more accommodating monetary policy. As it emerges from panel
B, when fiscal policy is passive, the Taylor principle, according to which the long-run response of the
nominal interest rate to increases in inflation should be more than one-to-one (φpi > 1), might not be
sufficient to achieve equilibrium uniqueness. Indeterminacy is likely to prevail under a high responsiveness
of monetary policy to the fluctuations in output. In panels C and D we plot determinacy regions in the
space of the fiscal policy parameters (τ l, τY ) under an active and a passive monetary policy conduct,
respectively. When monetary policy is active, the more countercyclical the fiscal policy is, the higher
the reactivity of taxes to government liabilities must be in order to ensure equilibrium determinacy. By
contrast, under a low reactivity of the fiscal burden to government liabilities and passive monetary policy,
equilibrium uniqueness is more likely to be verified under a countercyclical fiscal policy.
Let now examine the responses of the main variables of the model to a positive unit shock in govern-
ment spending under two alternative fiscal-monetary policy regimes (Figure 2). As in Woodford (2003),
the size of the fiscal shock is normalized to a one percent of steady-state output.
Consider first the case of a passive fiscal policy combined with an active monetary policy (Figure
2(A)). In particular, let assume τ l = 0.1, τY = 0.5, φpi = 1.5, φY = 0.125, i.e., the values of a standard
Taylor rule. The output dynamics display an intertemporal trade-off: the fiscal expansion boosts economic
activity in the short run but generates a persistent negative effect in the medium run, due to the crowding-
out in both private consumption and private investment.
Consider now the case of an active fiscal rule coupled with with a passive interest rate rule (Figure
2(B)). Specifically, let set τ l = 0, τY = 0.5, φpi = φY = 0, implying a pegged interest rate. When the tax
satisfied conditions for determinacy a dark point is plotted.
23For details see Appendix E.
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rule does not ensure a convergent pattern for real government liabilities for any bounded sequence of the
other endogenous variables, a government spending shock causes output, consumption, investment, capital
and asset prices to increase persistently above their initial steady state values. These expansionary effects
are sustained by both the passive behavior of monetary policy, implying cumulative decreases in the real
interest rate, and the wealth effects on aggregate demand, that are amplified by the ‘non-Ricardian’ fiscal
policy. As a result, in equilibrium, the inflationary effects necessary to prevent an explosive dynamics for
real government liabilities are about five times larger than in the previous fiscal-monetary regime.
4.2 Balanced-budget Rule
The evolution of real government liabilities under a balanced-budget rule allowing for temporary fiscal
deficits of the type described by (37) exhibits a unit root.24 Therefore a balanced-budget rule cannot be
strictly classified according to the active/passive dichotomy in Woodford’s (2003) sense and deserves a
separate analysis.25
Figure 3 shows that in our framework with wealth effects this particular fiscal regime is compatible
with a larger class of interest rate rules of Taylor’s type by enlarging the parameter space under which
determinacy is guaranteed (see panel B)26, unless fiscal policy is too much countercyclical (see panel
A). In particular, under passive monetary policies, where the nominal interest rate responds less than
proportionally to inflation changes, or under interest rate pegging rules, the system is not characterized by
sunspot fluctuations or instabilities as in the standard infinite horizon framework. Under balanced-budget
requirements, intergenerational wealth effects work as ‘automatic stabilizers’, not forcing necessarily the
central bank to implement aggressive interest rate rules. Hence, a remarkable advantage of our set up is
that it enables one to study the impact of fiscal policy shocks under a wider range of monetary policy
rules.
Figure 4 plots the impulse response functions to a unit shock to government spending under both active
(φpi > 1) and passive (φpi < 1) interest rate rules, respectively. Analyzing the impulse responses under the
alternative monetary policy rules, it emerges that the responses of the variables to the shocks are critically
affected by the conduct of monetary policy. Under an active monetary policy (Figure 4(A)), assuming
φpi = 1.5, φY = 0.125 and δY = −0.5, the dynamics are similar to those obtained in the case of a passive
tax rule. Output increases on impact, but declines thereafter below the long run equilibrium, returning
very slowly to the steady state. Inflation increases on impact while consumption, capital, investment
24See equation (A.32) in Appendix C.
25Broadly speaking, as emphasized by Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2000), the balanced-budget rule could be considered
‘passive’ in Leeper (1991)’s sense, since it implies that taxes are an increasing function of the stock of public debt.
26An analytical proof can be found in Annicchiarico and Piergallini (2006) in a simplified dsge framework with no capital
accumulation and real money balances.
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and asset prices initially decrease and slowly converge back to the steady state. Conversely, when the
monetary rule is passive (Figure 4(B)), assuming φpi = 0.5, φY = 0.125 and δY = −0.5, the patterns
are distinctly different. On impact there is an increase in output, capital, investment, consumption and
asset prices, supported by the accommodative behavior of the monetary authority.27 However, the initial
increase in inflation is almost two times larger than in the active monetary policy case.
5 Macroeconomic Stability
Let now explore the performance of alternative fiscal rules or different combinations of monetary and
fiscal rules by using Montecarlo experiments. We draw from a random generator a finite set of innovation
sequences
(
εGt , ε
r
t , ε
̥
t , ε
uw
t
)
for a sample period of 200 quarters. All values reported in Tables 2-4 represent
mean values of the standard deviations of inflation, output, the nominal interest rate and asset prices
over 1000 replications of the simulation experiment. The magnitudes shown in the Tables are expressed
in percentage points.
The first simulation exercise reported in Table 2 investigates the performance of monetary and fiscal
policies under feedback tax rules ensuring the convergence of government liabilities dynamics for any
bounded paths for the remaining endogenous variables. The results indicate that higher values for the
monetary policy inflation coefficient φpi lead to lower standard deviations for the inflation rate. Moreover,
an interest rate rule featuring a response to output entails in most cases a higher variability in all variables
of interest. This conclusion reinforces the results developed by McCallum (2001), and Schmitt-Grohe´ and
Uribe (2007).
Table 3 reports simulation results under the assumption that fiscal policy is conducted according to an
active tax rule. The results suggest that when the stability of government liabilities is not guaranteed by
fiscal authorities, an interest rate peg rule is predicted to perform better, in terms of inflation stabilization,
than feedback interest rate rules a` la Taylor. Intuitively, a feedback monetary rule reacting to inflation
dramatically worsens the dynamics of government liabilities when budgetary policies are potentially
unsustainable, thereby pinning down a higher inflation rate necessary to reduce the real value of public
debt. Hence, the well-known revaluation mechanism depicted by the ‘fiscal theory of the price level’ is
fully at work. In addition, large values for τY , capturing the response of the tax rule to output, entail
excessive variability.
Table 4 summarizes simulation results under balanced-budget requirements. As emphasized in the
previous sections, in our olg framework this fiscal regime permits to compare the performance of both
27This theoretical result is compatible with the empirical findings of Blanchard and Perotti (2002), showing an increase
in private consumption in response to a positive government spending shock.
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active and passive monetary policies, since the prospects for determinacy of rational expectations equi-
librium are enlarged. Active interest rate rules that do not feature an output stabilization motive imply
a lower variability for inflation, but they are likely to entail a higher variability for both output and asset
prices. Furthermore, the results support the view that strong responses of fiscal policy to output might
be undesirable.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we have presented a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with price stickiness
and capital accumulation, extended to include overlapping generations. An important feature of our
economy with finitely-lived individuals is that the dynamics for government liabilities and asset prices
as well as the lm relation significantly affect the monetary and fiscal policy transmission mechanisms,
because wealth effects do influence aggregate consumption dynamics. The general framework presented
in the paper is flexible enough for analyzing the effects of different fiscal policy rules, and their interaction
with monetary policy, in terms of macroeconomic stability and price developments. The analysis of the
performance of debt-based tax rules and balanced-budget rules allowing for temporary deficits shows
that the positive effect on economic activity generated by fiscal expansions is likely to be significantly
reversed in the medium run. An interesting insight of our set-up is that the balanced-budget rule is able
to enlarge the determinacy space under feedback interest rate rules. This allows the evaluation of the
effects of fiscal policy under both active and passive monetary policies. In this respect, we have shown
that the dynamics generated by fiscal shocks are critically influenced by the monetary policy regime.
On the one hand, fiscal policies aimed at balancing the budget are compatible with passive monetary
policies; on the other hand, active monetary policies in conjunction with a balanced budget rule deliver a
high degree of price stability, at the expense of output volatility. Finally, an important implication of the
results found is that controlling for monetary policy might be essential for an empirical characterization of
the effects of fiscal shocks. In other words, results of the empirical literature on the effect of fiscal policies
on macroeconomic variables could have been negatively influenced by the exclusion of the interaction
between monetary and fiscal policies.
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Appendixes
Appendix A: Individual Consumption
Combining (12) with (8) we obtain
Et {Λt,t+1 (s, j)Rt} = Et
{
Λt,t+1 (s, j)
(1− δ)Qt+1 +R
k
t+1
Qt
}
= 1. (A.1)
Using (A.1) we can write
Bs,t+1(j)
Rt
+Ms,t (j) +QtKs,t+1 (j)
= Et {Λt,t+1 (s, j) [Bs,t+1 (j) +Ms,t (j) +RtQtKs,t+1 (j)]}+
Rt−1
Rt
Ms,t (j)
= Et
{
Λt,t+1 (s, j)
[
Bs,t+1 (j) +Ms,t (j) +
(
Qt+1 (1− δ) +R
k
t+1
)
Ks,t+1 (j)
]}
+ Rt−1Rt Ms,t (j) .
(A.2)
Thus, the individual flow budget constraint can be written as
PtCs,t (j) + (1− λ)
Rt−1
Rt
Ms,t (j) + (1− λ)Et {Λt,t+1 (s, j)As,t+1 (j)}
≤ As,t (j) +Ws,t (j)Ns,t (j) + Zs,t (j)− Ts,t (j) ,
(A.3)
where
As,t (j) ≡ Bs,t (j) +Ms,t−1 (j) +
[
Qt (1− δ) +R
k
t
]
Ks,t (j) . (A.4)
Note that
Cs,t (j) + (1− λ)
Rt−1
Rt
Ms,t(j)
Pt
= 11−γCs,t (j)
= 11−γ C˜s,t (j) +
1
1−γ
(
PtCs,t(j)
Ms,t(j)
)γ
V (Ns,t (j)).
(A.5)
Thus, the flow budget constraint can be re-written as
1
1−γPtC˜s,t (j) + (1− λ)Et {Λt,t+1 (s, j)As,t+1 (j)}
≤ As,t (j) +Ws,t (j)Ns,t (j) + Zs,t (j)− Ts,t (j)−
1
1−γ
(
PtCs,t(j)
Ms,t(j)
)γ
PtV (Ns,t (j)).
(A.6)
From (A.6), imposing the transversality condition we obtain the intertemporal budget constraint:
1
1−γEt
∑
∞
T=t (1− λ)
T−t
Λt,T (s, j)PT C˜s,T (j)
≤ As,t (j) + Et
∑
∞
T=t (1− λ)
T−t
Λt,T (s, j) (Ws,T (j)Ns,T (j) + Zs,T (j)− Ts,T (j))
− 11−γEt
∑
∞
T=t (1− λ)
T−t
Λt,T (s, j)
(
PTCs,T (j)
Ms,T (j)
)γ
PTV (Ns,T (j))].
(A.7)
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Using the fact that
Et
{
Λt,T (s, j)PT C˜s,T (j)
}
= βT−tPtC˜s,t (j) , (A.8)
into equation (A.7) (which in the optimum holds with equality), one obtains equation (14) in the main
text.
Appendix B: The Dynamic Equation for Aggregate Consumption
Using (12) we can write
Bt+1
Rt
+Mt +QtKt+1 = Et
{
Λt,t+1
[
Bt+1 +Mt +
(
Qt+1 (1− δ) +R
k
t+1
)
Kt+1
]}
+
Rt − 1
Rt
Mt. (A.9)
Thus, the aggregate budget constraint can also be written as
Et {Λt,t+1At+1}+ PtCt +
Rt − 1
Rt
Mt = At +WtNt + Zt − Tt, (A.10)
where At denotes aggregate non-human wealth at the beginning of period t, defined as
At ≡ Bt +Mt−1 +
(
Qt (1− δ) +R
k
t
)
Kt. (A.11)
Note that
PtCt +
Rt − 1
Rt
Mt =
1
1− γ
PtCt. (A.12)
Substituting (A.10) into (18) and using (A.12) one obtains
PtC˜t = χ
 Et {Λt,t+1At+1}+ 11−γPtCt + Et∑∞T=t+1 (1− λ)T−t Λt,TΩT
− 11−γEt
∑
∞
T=t (1− λ)
T−t
Λt,TΨ
γ
TPTV (NT )
 , (A.13)
where Ωt =WtNt + Zt − Tt. Leading (18) one period forward yields
Pt+1C˜t+1 = χ
 At+1 + Et+1∑∞T=t+1 (1− λ)T−(t+1) Λt+1,TΩT
− 11−γEt+1
∑
∞
T=t (1− λ)
T−(t+1)
Λt+1,TΨ
γ
TPTV (NT )
 . (A.14)
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Multiplying both sides by Λt,t+1 (1− λ) and taking expectations:
(1− λ)Et
{
Λt,t+1Pt+1C˜t+1
}
= χ
 (1− λ)Et {Λt,t+1At+1}+ Et∑∞T=t+1 (1− λ)T−t Λt,TΩT
− 11−γEt
∑
∞
T=t+1 (1− λ)
T−t
Λt,TΨ
γ
TPTV (NT )
 . (A.15)
Solving (A.15) for Et
∑
∞
T=t+1 (1− λ)
T−t
Λt,TΩT , using χ ≡ (1− γ) [1− β (1− λ)], and substituting into
(A.13), one obtains
PtC˜t = (1− γ) [1− β (1− λ)]
 Et {Λt,t+1At+1} − (1− λ)Et {Λt,t+1At+1}
+ 11−γPt (Ct −Ψ
γ
t V (Nt))

+ (1− λ)Et
{
Λt,t+1Pt+1C˜t+1
}
.
(A.16)
Simplifying, (A.16) becomes
PtC˜t = (1− γ) [1− β (1− λ)]
[
λEt {Λt,t+1At+1}+
1
1− γ
PtC˜t
]
+ (1− λ)Et
{
Λt,t+1Pt+1C˜t+1
}
(A.17)
Rearranging (A.17), we obtain the dynamic equation for aggregate adjusted consumption,
PtC˜t =
1
β
Et
{
Λt,t+1Pt+1C˜t+1
}
+
λ (1− γ) [1− β (1− λ)]
β (1− λ)
Et {Λt,t+1At+1} , (42)
which is equation (21) in the main text.
Appendix C: Linearized Equilibrium Conditions
This Appendix performs a first-order log-linear approximation of the global system around a non-
stochastic steady state characterized by zero inflation and positive public debt. In general, we let
X̂t ≡ logXt − logX be the log-deviation of a given economic variable Xt from its steady state value
X.
On the demand-side, the log-linear version of the dynamic equation for aggregate adjusted consump-
tion (21) is given by
̂˜
Ct = −
(
r˜t −
1
1 + ω
Et {pit+1}
)
+
1
1 + ω
Et
{̂˜
Ct+1
}
+
ω
1 + ω
ât+1, (A.19)
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where at ≡
At
Pt−1
and ω ≡ βR− 1 = λχ(1−λ)
a
C˜
. The aggregate real financial wealth approximates to
ât+1 ≡ s
−1
a l̂t+1 +Rs
−1
a sK
(
r˜t + q̂t + K̂t+1
)
, (A.20)
where qt ≡
Qt
Pt
, sa ≡
a
Y , sK ≡
K
Y =
( IY )
δ =
α
(r+δ)(1+up) . Aggregate adjusted consumption approximates
to ̂˜
Ct ≡
C
C˜
Ĉt −
γ
r
(
C
C˜
− 1
)
r˜t − (1 + ϕ)
(
C
C˜
− 1
)
N̂t, (A.21)
where ϕ ≡ V ′′ (N) NV ′(N) is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply,
C
C˜
≡ C
C−Ψ−γ N
1+ϕ
1+ϕ
=
1
1−Ψ−γ(NY )(
Y
C )
Nϕ
1+ϕ
, and NY =
(1−α)( 11+up )
1+uw
1−γ
Ψ−γNϕ
. The equation describing asset prices dynamics can be derived
as
q̂t =
1
R
(1− δ)Et {q̂t+1}+
[
1−
1
R
(1− δ)
]
Et
{
r̂kt+1
}
− (r˜t −Et {pit+1}) , (A.22)
where rkt ≡
Rkt
Pt
. The log-linearized equation for investment demand is
Ît − K̂t = ηq̂t, (A.23)
where η ≡ −φ′′
(
I
K
) φ′( IK )
I
K
. From (19), one can derive the lm relation as
m̂t = Ĉt −
1
R− 1
r˜t, (A.24)
where mt ≡
Mt
Pt
. The labor supply equation (20) can be expressed as
ŵt = ϕN̂t +
γ
R− 1
r˜t + u
w
t , (A.25)
where wt ≡
Wt
Pt
.
On the supply-side, the log-linear approximations to the optimal price setting equation (27) and the
definition of price index (28) yield
pit =
1
R
Et {pit+1}+ κM̂Ct, (A.26)
where κ ≡ (1−θ)(R−θ)Rθ , and
M̂Ct = ŵt −
(
Ŷt − N̂t
)
= r̂kt −
(
Ŷt − K̂t
)
.
(A.27)
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In addition, the aggregate production function can be approximated as
Ŷt = ̥̂ t + αK̂t + (1− α) N̂t. (A.28)
The law of motion of capital (29) becomes
K̂t+1 = δÎt + (1− δ) K̂t. (A.29)
Market clearing in the goods’ market implies
Ŷt = sCĈt + sI Ît + Ĝt, (A.30)
where sC ≡
C
Y , sI ≡
I
Y , and Ĝt ≡
Gt−G
Y .
On the public sector-side, the log-linear version of the evolution of government liabilities (33) is given
by
l̂t+1 = R
(
l̂t −
d
Y
pit + Ĝt − τ̂ t
)
+ sbr˜t − (R− 1) smm̂t, (A.31)
where sb ≡
B
PY and sm ≡
m
Y .
Under the balanced-budget rule, equation (36) can be approximated as
l̂t+1 = l̂t + sb (r˜t − r˜t−1 − pit)− rsm (m̂t − m̂t−1)−Rsmpit +Rdt. (A.32)
Appendix D: Model Solution
The log-linearized model can be written in matrix form as follows:
 A11nF×nF A12nF×nS
A21
nS×nF
A22
nS×nS

 EtF t+1nF×1
EtSt+1
nS×1
 =
 B11nF×nF B12nF×nS
B21
nS×nF
B22
nS×nS

 F tnF×1
St
nS×1
+
 C1nS×nE
C2
nS×nE
 Et
(nF+nS)×nE
,
where
nF : number of non-predetermined variables;
nS : number of predetermined variables;
nE : number of exogenous stochastic processes;
F t =
[
Ŷt | Ĉt | Ît |
̂˜
Ct | N̂t | pit | q̂t | r˜t | r̂
k
t | ŵt | M̂Ct | τ̂ t
]′
contains the forward looking variables;
St =
[
r˜t−1 | τ̂ t−1 | l̂t | m̂t−1 | K̂t
]′
is the vector of predetermined variables;
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Et =
[
Ĝt | ̥̂ t | uwt | εrt | εdt ]′ is the vector of exogenously given stochastic processes evolving according
to Et = ΣEt−1 + εt, with εt =
[
εGt | ε
̥
t | u
w
t | ε
r
t | ε
d
t
]′
defined as the vector of white noises and Σ being
the nE × nE diagonal matrix reporting the autoregressive coefficients of the exogenous variables. The
relevant matrices of the system depend on the fiscal rule adopted by the government.
The multivariate linear rational expectations model can be solved by applying the algorithm pro-
posed by Klein (2000), which is based on the generalized Schur decomposition. We have applied Klein’s
algorithm to solve the model under the alternative fiscal rules defined in the main text.
Appendix E: ‘Active’ and ‘Passive’ Fiscal Policy
After substituting the tax rule (34) into (A.31), government liabilities evolve as
l̂t+1 = R
[
(1− τ l) l̂t −
d
Y
pit + Ĝt − τY Ŷt
]
+ sbr˜t − (R− 1) smm̂t. (A.33)
Under the tax rule (34), stability of the government liabilities process requires that the coefficient on l̂t
be less than one, so that fiscal policy is passive (active) if and only if |R (1− τ l)| < (>) 1. Hence, the
restriction |R (1− τ l)| < 1 rules out any explosive path of the government liabilities.
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Table 1: Calibration
Baseline Calibration
Steady state real interest rate r 0.01
Steady state public spending to output ratio G/Y 0.2
Steady state investment to output ratio I/Y 0.2
Steady state public debt to output ratio b/Y 2.4
Steady state money velocity PY/M 0.925
Steady state time in employment N 1/3
Probability of death λ 0.015
Inverse of the (Frisch) labor supply elasticity ϕ 0.47
Degree of price stickiness θ 0.75
Elasticity of output with respect to capital α 0.3
Depreciation rate δ 0.025
Degree of inertia in the monetary rule ρr 0.9
Degree of inertia in the balanced-budget rule ρd 0.9
Implied Parameters
Discount factor β 0.998
Weight of money in the utility function γ 0.018
Consumption to output ratio C/Y 0.6
Capital to output ratio K/Y 8.0
Steady state primary surplus to output ratio (τ −G) /Y 0.024
Consumption to subsistence consumption ratio C/
(
C − C˜
)
3.0
Price mark-up up 0.071
Steady state wage mark-up uw 0.092
Shocks
Persistence of public spending shock ρG 0.966
Persistence of technology shock ρ̥ 0.958
Standard deviation of public spending shock σG 0.001
Standard deviation of monetary shock σr 0.001
Standard deviation of wage-push shock σuw 0.003
Standard deviation of technology shock σ̥ 0.005
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Table 2: Simulation Results under a Passive Tax Rule
Values of φpi, φY
Values of τ l, τY 1.5, 0.0 3.0, 0.0 1.5, 0.125 3.0, 0.125
0.1, 0.0
0.29
3.33
0.26
2.98
0.12
3.43
0.20
3.10
1.25
4.04
1.08
3.10
0.32
3.50
0.37
3.06
σpi
σŶ
σr˜
σq̂
0.5, 0.0
0.29
3.34
0.26
2.98
0.12
3.51
0.20
3.15
1.23
3.98
1.06
3.10
0.32
3.55
0.37
3.09
σpi
σŶ
σr˜
σq̂
0.1, 0.5
0.30
3.37
0.28
3.08
0.13
3.47
0.21
3.23
1.15
3.94
1.01
3.12
0.32
3.58
0.38
3.26
σpi
σŶ
σr˜
σq̂
Note: Table reports standard deviations of pit, Ŷt, r˜t, and q̂t, respectively (percentages).
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Table 3: Simulation Results under an Active Tax Rule
Values of φpi, φY
Values of τ l, τY 0.0, 0.0 0.5, 0.0 0.8, 0.125 1.0, 0.125
0.0, 0.0
0.47
2.82
0.19
2.41
0.59
2.80
0.30
2.45
1.01
2.17
0.76
2.20
1.29
2.39
1.08
2.41
σpi
σŶ
σr˜
σq̂
0.0, 0.5
0.94
3.07
0.20
2.87
1.24
3.16
0.44
3.01
1.55
2.75
0.91
2.74
2.85
4.44
2.10
4.36
σpi
σŶ
σr˜
σq̂
0.0, 0.8
1.03
3.28
0.19
3.15
1.40
3.48
0.48
3.40
1.92
3.30
1.10
3.34
9.46
14.27
7.15
14.76
σpi
σŶ
σr˜
σq̂
Note: Table reports standard deviations of pit, Ŷt, r˜t, and q̂t, respectively (percentages).
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Table 4: Simulation Results under the Balanced-Budget Rule
Values of φpi, φY
Values of δY 0.0, 0.0 0.8, 0.0 1.5, 0.0 3.0, 0.0 1.5, 0.125 3.0, 0.125
0.0
0.46
2.75
0.19
2.47
0.52
2.83
0.27
2.48
0.28
3.29
0.25
2.86
0.12
3.44
0.20
3.08
1.00
3.52
0.83
2.62
0.32
3.60
0.37
3.00
σpi
σŶ
σr˜
σq̂
−0.1
0.72
2.72
0.20
2.48
0.62
2.85
0.33
2.46
0.28
3.32
0.25
2.89
0.18
3.43
0.25
3.02
1.01
3.54
0.83
2.61
0.32
3.58
0.38
3.05
σpi
σŶ
σr˜
σq̂
−0.5
1.09
3.52
0.19
3.40
0.97
2.96
0.52
2.51
0.61
3.29
0.51
2.71
instability
1.05
3.60
0.87
2.70
0.66
3.71
0.65
2.96
σpi
σŶ
σr˜
σq̂
Note: Table reports standard deviations of pit, Ŷt, r˜t, and q̂t, respectively (percentages).
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Figure 1: Determinacy Space under a Tax Rule
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Figure 2˙: Impulse Response Functions to a Unit Government Spending Shock under a Tax Rule
A: Passive Fiscal Policy and Active Monetary Policy
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B: Active Fiscal Policy and Passive Monetary Policy
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Figure 3: Determinacy Space under a Balanced-budget Rule
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Figure 4: Impulse Response Functions to a Unit Government Spending Shock under a Balanced-budget
Rule
A: Active Monetary Policy
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B: Passive Monetary Policy
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